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Worker Remittances in the Arab 
World: Blessing or Burden? 
ROBERT E. LOONEY 
Contruversy has surrounded the question of how worker remit-
tances affect development in the labor-exporting countries. Can 
these remittances be channeled into productive investment, or do 
they merely exacerbate problems relating to balance of payments 
and foreign exchange? Here, in exploring these issues with refer-
ence to the Arab world, it is found that remittances have contributed 
marginally at best to development while fueling inflation. 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the trade in human capital in the Arab world has 
generated significant financial flows in the form of remittances in 
the nonoil-producing states. In a number of cases these flows 
have greatly exceeded earnings from commodity trade. The 
resulting expansion in aggregate demand in these countries, un-
accompanied in the short run by any increase in domestic supply, 
led to pressure on both the price level and the current account of 
the balance of payments. One theory is that such pressure 
together with the inadequacies of domestic capital markets work 
to inhibit the optimal employment of emigrants' remittances. 
Rather than financing capital accumulation in productive activ-
ity, it is suggested, a large proportion of these funds flowed into 
increased levels of consumption.1 
To date, this assertion has been supported with largely 
anecdotal evidence. My purpose here is to examine these issues. 
Do worker remittances affect the macroeconomic development 
patterns in the Arab world in a mar\ner significantly different 
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from other sources of foreign exchange? If so, in what sense? 
What are the policy implications for the exporting countries? 
PA TIERNS OF REMITI ANCES 
By the early 1980s, there were probably some six million migrant 
workers in the six Gulf states, of whom over two million were 
Arabs, about 3.7 million from Asia, and the rest from Africa,. 
Europe, and the Americas. This compares with only about 
660,000 migrant workers in 1970, the product of the earlier boom, 
and 1,250,000 in 1975-perhaps a fifth of whom were Asians. 
Obviously, the migration of labor has been tied very closely 
to the oil price boom. This has occurred in two important ways: 
it was the boom that vastly increased the demand for labor in the 
oil-exporting countries, while at the same time giving the labor-
sending countries every incentive to try to compensate for the 
crippling rise in the cost of their oil imports by encouraging their 
citizens to work abroad and remit as much as possible. 
There is considerable controversy about the actual magni-
tude of remittances in the region. It is apparent that underre-
porting is a problem. Formal channels capture only part of the 
remittances, but the exact percentage is far from clear.2 Research 
on remittances from France to North Africa, for example, sug-
gests that around 20 percent of remittances are not transmitted by 
money order but through less formal channels. Remittances may 
also be made in kind, with the goods sometimes being resold after 
clearing customs-a practice that exporting governments are 
trying to eliminate.3 
In terms of the official statistics, remittances are included in 
the balance of payments figures under "unrequited transfers." 
These are offsetting entries for the provision of real resources or 
financial items by one economy to another without a quid pro 
quo. This means that whenever a given economy does not receive 
(supply) a recompense in the form of real resources or financial 
items for goods, services, or capital supplied to (or received from) 
another economy, the balance of payments statement records an 
unrequited transfer. The value of the unrequited transfer has to 
be the same as that of the real and financial resources for which 
the unrequited transfers are offsets. 
TABLE 1 
Worker Remittances in the Arab World: 
Labor Exporters, 1976-1981 
(millions of US dollars) 
Country 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Jordan receipts 410.9 469.9 522.0 601.0 794.4 1032.5 
Jordan payments -24.4 -54.4 -67.7 -100.5 -161.8 -162.3 
Jordan net 386.5 415.5 454.3 500.5 632.6 870.2 
Algeria receipts 451.4 370.1 419.4 444.4 451.6 465.8 
Algeria payments -63.5 -84.1 -112.7 -130.5 -165.3 -149.8 
Algeria net 387.9 286.0 306.7 313.9 286.3 316.0 
Syria receipts 53.1 92.2 636.0 901.8 773.1 583.3 
Syria payments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Syria net 53.1 92.2 636.0 901.8 773.1 583.3 
Somalia receipts 1.4 3.2 78.1 36.7 57.3 56.2 
Somalia payments -0.2 -0.9 -0.1 -0.8 0.0 -2.7 
Somalia net 1.2 2.3 78.0 35.9 57.3 53.5 
Egypt receipts 841.6 987.7 1824.2 2268.8 2791.7 2229.9 
Egypt payments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Egypt net 841.6 987.7 1824.2 2268.8 2791.7 2229.9 
Morocco receipts 547.2 588.4 762.5 948.3 1054.2 1012.9 
Morocco payments -48.5 -52.5 -62.6 -68.5 -65.1 -47.2 
Morocco net 498.7 535.9 699.9 879.8 989.1 965.7 
Yemen AR receipts 795.1 1256.1 1286.3 1239.2 1321.5 975.2 
Yemen AR payments -118.6 -243.0 -345.3 -284.0 -231.7 -185.6 
Yemen AR net 676.5 1013.1 941.0 955.2 1089.8 789.6 
PDR Yemen receipts 120.8 191.4 257.7 322.2 352.3 409.5 
PDR Yemen payments -1.5 -4.1 -2.9 -5.2 -4.9 -5.0 
PDR Yemen net 119.3 187.3 254.8 317.0 374.4 405.5 
Tunisia receipts 142.0 161.1 221.6 282.9 318.9 357.3 
Tunisia payments -9.2 -11.7 -15.0 -14.2 -14.3 -11.8 
Tunisia net 132.8 149.4 206.6 268.2 304.6 345.5 
Sudan receipts 40.1 40.4 68.9 127.6 262.6 379.8 
Sudan payments -2.3 -2.9 -2.9 -12.1 -43.6 -54.7 
Sudan net 37.8 37.5 66.0 115.5 219.0 325.1 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments and External Public Debt of Arab Countries, 
1976-1986 (Abu Dhabi: Arab Monetary Fund, September 1988). 
TABLE2 
Worker Remittances in the Arab World: 
Labor Exporters, 1982-1986 
(millions of US dollars) 
Country 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Jordan receipts 1084.0 1109.9 1235.6 1021.8 1185.3 
Jordan payments -177.1 -200.5 -253.9 -235.9 -274.0 
Jordan net 906.9 909.4 981.7 785.9 911.3 
Algeria receipts 513.4 397.7 333.1 332.0 309.7 
Algeria payments -127.0 -156.1 -141.5 -131.0 -100.9 
Algeria net 386.4 241.6 191.6 201.0 208.8 
Syria receipts 446.0 460.7 na na na 
Syria payments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Syria net 446.0 460.7 na na na 
Somalia receipts 20.0 21.7 169.4 38.2 na 
Somalia payments -6.2 -2.6 -6.5 -18.8 -22.6 
Somalia net 13.8 19.1 162.9 19.4 na 
Egypt receipts 2480.7 3688.1 3981.1 3216.5 2515.3 
Egypt payments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Egypt net 2480.7 3688.1 3981.1 3216.5 2515.3 
Morocco receipts 849.0 916.1 872.3 967.6 1398.5 
Morocco payments -37.5 -34.2 -26.7 -17.3 -15.3 
Morocco net 811.5 881.9 845.6 950.4 1374.2 
Yemen AR receipts 1176.3 1222.6 1065.8 943.8 783.6 
Yemen AR payments -249.9 -130.6 -69.8 -68.6 -87.9 
Yemen AR net 926.4 1092.0 996.0 875.2 695.7 
PDR Yemen receipts 474.5 490.8 505.5 429.1 283.4 
PDR Yemen payments -4.6 -4.4 -6.0 -3.5 -1.8 
PDR Yemen net 469.0 486.4 499.5 425.6 281.6 
Tunisia receipts 372.0 359.2 316.7 271.1 361.3 
Tunisia payments -12.1 -8.6 -10.3 -11.2 -3.5 
Tunisia net 359.9 350.6 306.4 259.9 357.8 
Sudan receipts 130.7 274.8 283.7 258.9 115.0 
Sudan payments -25.4 -28.5 -8.0 -11.8 -25.0 
Sudan net 105.3 24g,3 275.7 247.1 90.0 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments and External Public Debt of Arab Countries, 
1976-1986 (Abu Dhabi: Arab Monetary Fund, September 1988). 
TABLE3 
Worker Remittances in the Arab World: 
Labor Importers, 1976-1981 
(millions of US dollars) 
Country 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Saudi Arabia receipts 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Saudi Arabia payments -988.3 -1506.1 -2844.5 -3365.7 -4093.2 -5348.9 
Saudi Arabia net -988.3 -1506.1 -2844.5 -3365.7 -4093.2 -5348.9 
Oman receipts 0.0 0.0 28.8 32.3 35.1 41.3 
Oman payments -219.4 -221.8 -241.6 -281.7 -397.0 -497.6 
Oman net -219.4 -221.8 -212.8 -249.4 -361.9 -456.3 
Kuwait receipts 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Kuwait payments -315.2 -307.1 -433.2 -532.3 -692.4 -688.7 
Kuwait net -315.2 -307.1 -433.2 -532.3 -692.4 -688.7 
Libya receipts 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Libya payments -243.6 -839.4 -931.5 -832.0 -1051.6 -1530.6 
Libya net -243.6 -839.4 -931.5 -832.0 -1051.6 -1530.6 
Bahrain receipts 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bahrain payments -252.7 -300.5 -386.4 -278.8 -285.2 -317.6 
Bahrain net -252.7 -300.5 -386.4 -278.8 -285.2 -317.6 
Mauritania receipts 0.5 0.4 0.5 2.3 5.6 3.7 
Mauritania payments -24.9 -22.3 -21.2 -32.2 -32.1 -21.5 
Mauritania net -24.4 -29.1 -20.7 -29.9 -26.5 -17.8 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments and External Public Debt of Arab Countries, 
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TABLE4 
Worker Remittances in the Arab World: 
Labor Importers, 1982-1986 
(millions of US dollars) 
Country 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Saudi Arabia receipts 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Saudi Arabia payments -5346.7 -5236.0 -5282.9 -5199.4 -4804.3 
Saudi Arabia net -5346.7 -5236.0 -5282.9 -5199.4 -4804.3 
Oman receipts 43.1 43.8 43.1 43.7 38.7 
Oman payments -596.2 -735.5 -860.0 -946.3 -890.5 
Oman net -553.1 -691.7 -816.9 -902.6 -851.8 
Kuwait receipts 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Kuwait payments -875.5 -864.8 -962.5 -1043.7 -1084.0 
Kuwait net -875.5 -864.8 -962.5 -1043.7 -1084.0 
Libya receipts 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Libya payments -1574.3 -2032.2 na na na 
Libya net -1574.3 -2032.2 na na na 
Mauritania receipts 2.3 1.2 0.9 0.8 1.9 
Mauritania payments -31.5 -27.2 -24.1 -24.3 -29.7 
Mauritania net -29.2 -26.0 -23.2 -23.5 -27.8 
Bahrain receipts 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bahrain payments -322.1 -298.4 -331.7 -402.2 -706.4 
Bahrain net -322.1 -298.4 -331.7 -402.2 -706.4 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments and External Public Debt of Arab Countries, 
1976-1986 (Abu Dhabi: Arab Monetary Fund, September 1988). 
Several trends stand out in the recorded4 volume of remit-
tances (Tables 1-4): 
1. Despite the post-1982 fall in oil prices and revenues, 
several of the Arab labor-exporting countries have been able to 
maintain and even increase their temittances. For example, 
Jordan's remittances in 1986 were higher than those received at 
the height of the oil boom (1981). The same is also true of Tunisia 
and Egypt, al though in the latter case the 1986 level of remittances 
was lower than that for 1980. 
34 Worker Remittances in the Arab World 
2. The usual case in recent years, however, has been a fall-off 
in remittances. This decline has been fairly dramatic for several 
of the major exporters, including the two Yemens and Sudan. 
3. The labor importers are dominated by Saudi Arabia. 
Although this country's remittances have fallen off somewhat in 
recent years, the 1986 figures had not declined in a manner 
commensurate with the country's oil revenues. Whereas oil 
revenues have fallen from around $95 billion in 1981 to about $20 
billion in 1986, remittances declined from $5.3 billion (1981) to 
$4.9 billion (1986). 
4. On the other hand, several of the labor importers actually 
had higher levels of remittance payments in 1986 than in the early 
1980s. Kuwait, the second largest labor importer, actually had 
significantly larger remittances in 1986 than at the height of the 
second oil boom (1981-1982). The same applies to Bahrain, whose 
remittances in 1982 were over twice those of 1980. The same is 
also true of Oman. 
How significant are these foreign currency inflows for the 
recipient countries? Again, while the amounts of the remittances 
are most likely understated, it is still apparent that they account 
for significant shares of gross national product. The following 
patterns are of particular interest (Tables 5, 6): 
1. Most important, it is apparent that many of the countries 
receive a significant proportion, often well over half, of their 
foreign exchange from remittances. Jordan falls into this cate-
gory, as do Egypt and Sudan in recent years. As is well known, 
the Yemens receive most of their foreign exchange from this 
source. 
2. Although leveling off in absolute terms in recent years, 
remittances have been increasing asa share of export earnings for 
several of the major exporters: Jordan, Egypt, the Yemens, 
Tunisia, and Sudan have all had remittances score significant 
increases in their share of exports. 
3. On the other hand, there has been a leveling off or even a 
slight decline in the importance of remittances in the overall gross 
domestic product of several of the major labor exporters. These 
include PDR Yemen and perhaps Jordan and Egypt. Remittances 
have increased in relative importance in the economies of Yemen 
Arab Republic and perhaps Sudan. 
TABLES 
Relative Share of Worker Remittances in 
the Arab World: Labor Exporters, 1976-1980 
(Ratio of remittances to:) 
Country 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
!. Jordan GDP 0.30 0.27 0.22 0.20 0.19 
Jordan imports 0.30 0.25 0.23 0.18 0.20 
Jordan ex ports 0.70 0.60 0.52 0.44 0.40 
Algeria GDP 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Algeria imports 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 
Algeria exports 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.02 
Syria GDP 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.09 0.06 
Syria imports 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.25 0.17 
Syria exports 0.04 0.07 0.52 0.47 0.32 
Somalia GDP 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.04 
Somalia imports 0.01 0.01 0.28 0.09 0.12 
Somalia exports 0.01 0.03 0.71 0.34 0.43 
Egypt GDP 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.11 
Egypt imports 0.18 0.15 0.22 0.29 0.23 
Egypt exports 0.29 0.22 0.37 0.47 0.27 
Morocco GDP 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 
Morocco imports 0.14 0.13 0.18 0.19 0.19 
Morocco exports 0.28 0.27 0.31 0.32 0.29 
Yemen AR GDP 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.13 
Yemen AR imports 0.15 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.18 
Yemen AR exports 1.95 3.53 2.45 1.80 2.12 
PDR Yemen GDP 0.38 0.48 0.55 0.59 0.56 
PDR Yemen imports 0.39 0.45 0.58 0.65 0.54 
PDR Yemen exports 1.44 2.12 2.89 3.10 3.87 
Tunisia GDP 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Tunisia imports 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.08 
Tunisia exports 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.09 
Sudan GDP 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Sudan imports 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.11 
Sudan exports 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.19 0.18 
• 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments and External Public Debt of Arab Countries, 
1976-1986 (Abu Dhabi: Arab Monetary Fund, September 1988). 
TABLE6 
Relative Share of Worker Remittances in 
the Arab World: Labor Exporters, 1981-1985 
(Ratio of remittances to:) 
Country 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Jordan GDP 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.20 
Jordan imports 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.21 
Jordan ex ports 0.46 0.48 0.52 0.51 2.11 
Algeria GDP 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Algeria imports 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Algeria exports 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 
Syria GDP 0.03 0.03 0.02 na na 
Syria imports 0.11 0.10 0.09 na na 
Syria exports 0.22 0.18 0.19 na na 
Somalia GDP 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.03 
Somalia imports 0.12 0.03 0.05 0.38 0.08 
Somalia exports 0.31 0.01 0.14 1.35 0.22 
Egypt GDP 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.07 
Egypt imports 0.19 0.21 0.32 0.30 0.24 
Egypt exports 0.29 0.28 0.42 0.44 1.30 
Morocco GDP 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08 
Morocco imports 0.19 0.16 0.22 0.20 0.23 
Morocco exports 0.31 0.26 0.30 0.28 0.46 
Yemen AR GDP 0.14 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.24 
Yemen AR imports 0.19 0.40 0.52 0.60 0.58 
Yemen AR exports 1.64 4.41 4.44 4.64 18.66 
PDR Yemen GDP 0.53 0.52 0.48 0.46 0.38 
PDR Yemen imports 0.49 0.54 0.52 0.49 0.39 
PDR Yemen exports 4.14 4.39 4.16 3.81 8.39 
Tunisia GDP 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 
Tunisia imports 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.08 
Tunisia exports 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.19 
Sudan GDP 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Sudan imports 0.15 0.06 0.12 0.15 0.20 
Sudan exports 0.22 O.Q8 0.22 0.25 0.50 
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments and External Public Debt of Arab Countries, 
1976-1986 (Abu Dhabi: Arab Monetary Fund, September 1988). 
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BENEFITS AND COSTS OF REMITIANCES 
The monetary consequences from remittances are considerable. 
First, by relieving the intensity of the foreign exchange constraint 
that characterizes the poorer countries of the region, these remit-
tances might underwrite a higher domestic growth rate. Since 
development projects require mobilizing a mixture of foreign 
and domestic resources, the more foreign exchange available to 
the country, the more domestic resources it is able to utilize.5 This 
is the foreign trade multiplier effect, which can be especially 
strong in countries lacking other major sources of foreign ex-
change.6 
As mentioned, however, remittances may lose, through 
induced offsetting effects, much of their potential contribution to 
the growth of the exporting countries. One problem is inflation. 
Money sent back to the labor-exporting country will be used by 
recipients to increase their general level of consumption and 
foster appetites for many items that in the short run are not in 
adequate supply. The resulting price increases may result in an 
overall increase in inflation throughout the economy. 
In summary, the major benefits (potential and actual) of 
remittances for the labor-expo'rting countries consist of permit-
ting the labor-exporting country to:7 
1. Ease its foreign exchange constraints and improve the 
balance of payments 
2. Import increased amounts of capital goods and raw ma-
terials for industrial development 
3. Increase its supply of savings and investment for capital 
formation and development 
4. Cushion the effects of oil price increases 
5. Make a net addition to resources 
6. Increase the immediate standard of living of recipients 
7. Improve its income distribution (if poorer /less skilled 
migrate) 
• On the other hand, the costs (again actual and potential) of 
remittances are that they:8 
1. Represent an unpredictable (and presumably unreliable) 
source of foreign exchange 
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2. Are spent on consumer goods that increase demand, 
increase inflation, and push up wage levels 
3. Result in little or no investment in capital generation 
activities 
4. Have a high import content of consumption demand, 
which increases dependency on imports and exacerbates 
balance of payments problems 
5. Replace other sources of income, thereby increasing de-
pendency, eroding good work habits, and heightening 
potential negative effects of return migration 
6. Are spent on "unproductive" or "personal" investment 
(e.g., real estate, housing) 
7. Create envy and resentment and induce consumption 
spending among nonmigrants 
As Choucri9 has noted, what makes the remittance situation 
so critical and yet so vexing is the convergence of three essential 
features. First, these are earnings of private citizens; the govern-
ments of the region see little of these riches. Second, these 
earnings may be volatile; they are tied to economic activity in the 
receiving country. And third, "they are illusionary; they are 
there but they are not quite there .... Indeed, the region's labor-
exporting countries are extremely capital-rich; it is their govern-
ments that are poor."10 
Once the earnings are remitted, it is conventionally believed 
that a variety of economic effects take place. This added income 
in the hands of consumers, it is thought, translates into more 
purchasing power, leads to increased aggregate demand, and 
eventually increases output. Most observers believe, however, 
that remittances are essentially "squanderables," going into 
consumer goods, luxury items, and so forth. Generally, almost 
everyone attributes the growing inflation in the labor-exporting 
countries to the flow of remittances. On balance there are 
"goods" and "bads" associated with remittances; how much of 
each remains is quite unclear.11 
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EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS 
To gain some perspective on the major patterns associated with 
remittances, a preliminary factor analysis12 was undertaken to 
determine the way in which these flows interacted with several 
of the key macroeconomic variables discussed above. In particu-
lar, we are interested in determining whether the foreign ex-
change earned through remittances impacts in a manner funda-
mentally different from that earned from other sources, in par-
ticular, the earnings from merchandise exports.13 
Because the way in which remittances have impacted on the 
local economy14 is likely to have changed over the period in 
question, three years were examined: (a) 1976, the initial year for 
which comprehensive data wereavailable,(b) 1981, the height of 
the oil boom, and (c) 1985, the final year for which comprehensive 
data were available.15 
The main findings16 for these three years were as follows: 
1. For the initial year, 1976, the ratio of remittances to exports 
was highly correlated with private consumption and the ratio of 
domestic expenditures (absorption) to GDP. As expected, the 
ratio of remittances to exports loaded negatively on the resource 
gap, indicating that countries with relatively large percentages of 
their foreign exchange earned through remittances tend to have 
deficits in their balance of payments. 
2. Increases in the share of remittances in exports also appear 
to have reduced the share of investment in absorption (and, to a 
much lesser extent, the share of investment in GDP). There do not 
appear to have been any applicable price effects at this time 
associated with the composition of foreign exchange earnings. 
3. Significantly, the correlation pattern for the share of mer-
chandise exports in total export earnings is considerably different 
from that of remittances. Increases in the share of merchandise 
export earnings tend to be associated with increased rates of 
investment and reduced rates of consumption. 
4. Merchandise export earnings may also have had a lower 
import component than remittances (as evidenced by their slightly 
negative loading on the import factor, compared with the posi-
tive loading of remittances). 
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By 1981, the picture had changed to the extent that: 
1. Remittances, while still tending to increase private con-
sumption, appear to have weakened in this regard. This is 
especially the case for consumption as a share of domestic expen-
ditures. On the other hand, the inflationary impact of remittances 
may have increased somewhat. 
2. Merchandise exports, on the other hand, appear to be 
losing their positive impact on investment. Although they were 
still negatively associated with consumption, this effect also 
appeared weaker than in 1976. 
3. The relative effects of remittances (positive) (\nd merchan-
dise exports (negative) on imports may have strengthened a bit 
over the 1976-1981 period. 
Finally, by 1985: 
1. The positive association of remittances with private con-
sumption, while still positive, appears to have weakened even 
further. The same also appears to be the case with investment. 
2. Merchandise exports also seem to be less associated with 
the rates of consumption and investment. 
3. Although remittances appear to have become more asso-
ciated with higher import levels, merchandise exports were also 
strengthening their loading on this variable, but with a negative 
sign. Both remittances and merchandise exports seem to have 
developed a stronger relationship with inflation, with remit-
tances strengthening inflationary pressures and merchandise 
exports reducing them. 
To sum up, there appears to be considerable evidence that 
the composition of foreign exchange earnings in the Arab world 
affects a number of important macroeconomic variables. As 
suggested by some of the descriptive writings on the labor-
exporting countries, it appears that remittances may increase the 
overall level of consumption while reducing investment. The 
opposite appears to occur as the share of merchandise exports 
increases. 
Increased remittances may also induce higher levels of 
imports and inflation, again in contrast to the pattern associated 
with merchandise exports. Howevl!r, these last relationships 
appear considerably weaker than the consumption/investment 
linkages. 
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The strongest pattern appears to be that between remittances 
and consumption. Other factors could also affect the share of 
consumption in GDP and total expenditures. Increased levels of 
government expenditures are often said to have a large direct 
consumption component, plus an indirect one through the effect 
of increased volumes of public sector wages and salaries on 
individual consumption patterns. On the other hand, govern-
ment expenditures in the Arab world tend to have a high invest-
ment component, and this effect may predominate to reduce the 
amount of resources used for consumption. 
Finally, in recent years, it has been suggested that balance of 
payments deficits in developing countries have stemmed in large 
part from efforts of governments to maintain standards of living 
in the face of deteriorating export markets and the increased costs 
of imports, especially oil. 
To examine the importance of these factors, further analysis 
was undertaken to determine the way in which they may have 
impacted on several macroeconomic aggregates in the exporting 
countries. The results are summarized in Table 7. 
Private Consumption 
1. At the beginning of the period under consideration, 1976, 
government expenditures were competing with the private sec-
tor for resources. This effect was strongest for private sector 
consumption's share of total domestic expenditures. 
2. To a certain extent, the government effect was offset 
through balance of payments deficits-given a share of govern-
ment expenditures in either GDP or total expenditures, increased 
balance of payments deficits facilitated increased levels of con-
sumption. 
3. At this time remittances were weakly positive in increas-
ing private consumption's share in both GDP and total expendi-
tures, with the total expenditures case the stronger of the two. 
4. In contrast, merchandise exp6rts were weakly negative 
(but never statistically significant) in affecting the share of private 
consumption. 
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TABLE7 
Arab Labor-Exporting Countries: 
Economic Impacts Associated With Remittances 
(direction of impact) 
Year, Private Investment Growth Inflation 
external inflow consumption 
1976 
Remittances +(weak) -(weak) insig + 
Merchandise 
exports -(weak) +(weak) + insig 
1981 
Remittances + insig + 
Merchandise 
exports insig insig + insig 
1985 
Remittances + insig + 
Merchandise 
exports + + insig 
By 1981: 
1. Governments in the Arab world were no longer compet-
ing with the private sector for resources, in the sense that in-
creases in the government share of either GDP or total expendi-
tures did not reduce the corresponding shares of private con-
sumption. 
2. The balance of payments deficit, while still significant, 
was somewhat weaker in facilitating increased shares of private 
consumption. 
3. On the other hand, remittances were beginning to play an 
important role in expanding private consumption. This effect 
was important for the private sector's share of both GDP and total 
domestic expenditures. 
4. Finally, merchandise exports were still having a relatively 
weak negative effect on consumption. 
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By 1985: 
1. Government expenditures were still competing weakly 
with the private sector. The resource gap, however, tended to 
offset.this effect in the case of the private sector's share of GDP, 
but not its share of total expenditures. 
2. Remittances were clearly increasing consumption, and 
merchandise exports played an even stronger role in reducing the 
shares of pri:vate consumption in both GDP and domestic expen-
ditures. 
In general, therefore, the results tend to support the view that 
the composition of foreign exchange earnings plays a role in the 
macroeconomic evolution of the Arab labor exporters. Increas-
ing the importance of foreign exchange earnings appears to 
expand the share of a country's resources devoted to private 
consumption. The relevant question at this point is which expen-
diture category decreases its claims of economic resources when 
consumption expands. A logical candidate is investment. 
Investment 
Based on the consumption findings above, we can assume that 
government expenditures have a large enough investment com-
ponent as to affect the overall shares of investment in GDP and 
absorption. On the other hand, increased balance of payments 
deficits appear to have been used to maintain consumption 
levels. 
Several interesting patterns were found: 
1. At the beginning of the period in question (1976), in-
creased government expenditures tended to increase the share of 
investment in both GDP and total expenditures. However, 
government expenditures were no longer a significant factor 
when merchandise exports were taken into account. 
2. The balance of payments deficit also appears to have 
played a role in expanding investment's share of GDP, but not its 
share of total expenditures. • 
3. From the point of view of the present article, it appears that 
at this time increased remittances reduce the relative importance 
of investment, whereas merchandise exports increase the share of 
output and expenditures devoted to investment. 
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4. These trends were reinforced over time so that by 1985 
remittances were significantly reducing investment, whereas 
merchandise exports were associated with increased shares of 
investment in both GDP and total consumption. 
Growth 
Growth in developing countries is in part a simple function of 
capital formation. Although other factors contribute to economic 
expansion, their ability to sustain growth in the absence of new 
capital formation is limited. Put differently, autonomous in-
creases in productivity, a major source of growth in the advanced 
countries, often play a diminished role in the less developed 
world.17 In the absence of significant increases in productivity, 
increased output can come from the fuller utilization of existing 
resources. 
Based on the results in the previous two sections, we hy-
pothesize that, in addition to expanded investment, growth 
could be accelerated through increased demand for underem-
ployed resources. These could exist either in the consumer goods 
sector or in investment goods. As noted, relative increases in 
remittances have tended to expand the share of consumer goods 
in overall output, and merchandise exports have performed a 
similar role in affecting the shares of investment. To control for 
the effects of population growth and the expansion of govern-
ment expenditures, these variables were also included in the 
analysis. 
The main findings for the impact of remittances on growth 
(1976-1985) were as follows: 
1. By itself, investment accounts (during this period) for a 
little over 4 percent of the observed fluctuations in Arab-world 
growth rates. 
2. However, the growth in remittances did not make a 
further contribution to growth. On the other hand, the increased 
growth in merchandise exports contributed to overall growth, 
adding about 20 percent to the explanatory power of expanded 
investment. 
3. After controlling for investment and foreign exchange 
inflows, other variables such as population or expanded govern-
• 
! 
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ment expenditures do not appear to have played a significant role 
in the region's overall patterns of growth during this period. 
Inflation 
The fact that remittances did not significantly add to growth 
during this period suggests that the labor-exporting countries 
had limited amounts of excess capacity in the consumer area. If 
this was in fact the case, we might anticipate that increased levels 
of remittances would contribute to inflationary pressures in the 
region. 
Several other factors are present and need to be controlled for 
before any inflationary role can be ascribed to remittances. High 
rates of overall growth could cause inflationary pressures to 
build simply through demand outrunning supply. On the other 
hand, many of the countries in the region have, through increased 
levels of imports (financed either from oil revenues or foreign 
assistance), been able to partially contain inflation. If our image 
of the transmission process stemming from remittances is correct, 
inflation originating from this source should increase as remit-
tances are spent on consumer goods, the production of which is 
constrained due to capacity limitations. 
Since the foreign exchange emanating from merchandise 
exports appears to have a relatively greater chance of flowing into 
capacity-creatingcapital formation, we would anticipate increased 
rates of foreign exchange originating from this source either to be 
neutral or to reduce the overall rate of inflation. 
Incorporating these considerations into the analysis, it was 
found that remittances have tended to have a strong inflationary 
impact over the 1976-1985 period. This result holds regardless of 
how we define remittances. In contrast, merchandise exports 
have tended to reduce inflationary pressures, but this relation-
ship is weak at best. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Several years ago, a major study examining the role of labor 
migration in the development process identified the major con-
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troversies surrounding the impact of remittances on the labor-
exporting countries: 
At the heart of the question are the twin issues of labor and remittances . 
. . . Can remittances be channeled into productive investment, or are they, 
because of their dispersion, doomed to underwrite expanded imports of 
newly desired consumer goods, to finance food imports due to decline in 
agricultural production, and thus fuel inflation in land and home con-
struction? Despite the foreign exchange and balance of payments advan-
tages, do remittances help the development process or, like drug depend-
ence, do their existence and current uses primarily feed the need for more 
foreign exchange and exacerbate the balance of payments process, thus 
increasing the need for ever more remittances and the accompanying 
dependency on receiving countries?18 
The results presented above shed some light on these ques-
tions, at least as they pertain to the Arab world. In general, we 
would have to argue that remittances, while no doubt raising the 
overall standard of living of recipients in the labor-exporting 
countries, contribute marginally at best to the development 
process. Remittances have not been channeled in significant 
volumes into productive investment, nor have they facilitated 
higher rates of overall growth. Instead, they have been a major 
contributing factor to the increased rates ofinflation in the region, 
and have possibly compounded the balance of payments prob-
lems faced by the labor exporters. 
One can only speculate at this point as to the inability of 
remittances to make a more positive impact on the economies of 
the labor exporters. However, it has been fairly well docu-
mented19 that, in contrast to the foreign exchange earnings asso-
ciated with merchandise exports, a large volume of remittances 
travel through unofficial, informal, or even illegal channels. As 
a result, these funds are not easily tapped through taxes by 
governments, nor are they effectively mobilized by the organized 
financial system. 
In addition to limiting the contribution these funds can make 
to the region's development efforts, this fact has several implica-
tions. First, traditional monetary and exchange rate policies are 
difficult to implement in the labor-exporting countries simply 
because the impacts stemming from these policies are difficult to 
anticipate, given limited knowledge as to the volume of foreign 
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remittances must flow out of the receiving countries, reflecting 
the general underdevelopment of the local financial system. 
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